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Abstract 
The networks used in the Railway domain are usually heterogeneous, not enough protected and not fitted to the 
usual Cyber Security requirements in terms of sustainability, protection and attack detection. Furthermore, the 
quick evolution of the telecommunication means, the threats and the sustainability aspects have to be taken into 
account in order to protect the Railway system. 
The paper presents the first contributions on Cyber Security for railways that can be divided into three main 
aspects dealing with the Cyber Security of the wireless part of the railway communication system: detection, 
decision and Human-in-the-Loop. Part of the work will be devoted to the development of an Open Pluggable 
Framework (OPF). The OPF is a software framework based on automation principles. It monitors the 
environment, then some algorithms detect abnormal behaviours, and next, OPF decides which reaction to take 
and finally apply this action (e.g. an alarm or a reconfiguration). The last part “human in the loop” aims at 
answering the questions: what happens if the automatic countermeasures fail and how the driver can cope with 
the attack consequences. It consists in placing professional drivers and Central Traffic Control operators in a 
realistic simulator and playing scenarios involving attacks and observing the reactions of the professional 
drivers. A preliminary methodology is proposed and discussed through a concrete case study. 
 
Keywords: cyber-attacks detection, Software Defined Radio (SDR), classification algorithms, Train-tram 
Simulator, scenarios of threats, analysis of driver behaviour 
1. Introduction 
The networks used in the Railway domain are usually heterogeneous, not enough protected and not fitted to the 
usual Cyber Security requirements in terms of sustainability, protection and attack detection. Furthermore, the 
quick evolution of the telecommunication means, the threats and the sustainability aspects have to be taken into 
account in order to protect the Railway system. 
 
Through the SmartRaCon consortium, Railenium is an Associate Member on Innovation Programme (IP) 2 of 
the Joint Undertaking Shift2Rail. The activities on IP2 started through the X2Rail-1 project that deals with the 
start-up activities for Advanced Signalling and Automation System. In particular, Work Package (WP) 8 deals 
with the Cyber Security issues. 
 
The paper presents the first contributions of Railenium on WP8 that can be divided into three main aspects 
dealing with the Cyber Security of the wireless part of the railway communication system: detection, decision 
and Human-in-the-Loop. Part of the work will be devoted to the development of an Open Pluggable Framework 
(OPF). The OPF is a software framework based on automation principles. It monitors the environment, then 
some algorithms detect abnormal behaviours, and next, OPF decides which reaction to take and finally apply this 
action (e.g. an alarm or a reconfiguration). 
 
The first part of the work deals with the development of generic detection solutions able to detect different types 
of cyber-attacks targeting different levels of the network stack. The detection algorithms will be implemented on 
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Software Defined Radio (SDR) cards in order to propose hardware probes monitoring the physical layer. 
Software probes solutions will then be developed to monitor activities on the other levels of the network stack 
for different network protocols. The output of these probes will be injected into the OPF which constitutes the 
monitoring architecture. 
The second part of the work consists in investigating the use of adaptive classification algorithms for the 
detection and identification of attacks. It would allow to: (1) Detect unknown (new) internal and external threats 
and intrusions, (2) Build models with incomplete knowledge about the normal and safe modes, (3) Adapt the 
built models to evolving behaviours of the attackers to break the security rules. In such a system, some basic 
rules are coded in the first initialisation of the system and then the attack detection system will monitor and 
analyse any kind of possible drift in the behaviour of the operator to detect and localize further attacks more 
precisely. 
Finally, Human factor has to be addressed in the risk analysis. It consists in assessing the professional human 
driver and CTC (Central Traffic Control) supervisor abilities to react to (simulated) cyber-attacks, or to their 
consequences, in a realistic simulator, by reproducing scenarios involving humans, analysing their behaviours 
and their abilities to detect and to mitigate the threats. Then, the method will look for strategies, indicators and 
devices useful for human counter measures. More generally, the work consists in improving human detection 
and recovery and enhancing their system resilience. 
2. Detection solutions of cyber-attacks 
Given the rapid evolution of telecommunication and cyber threats, the railway sector has a double concern to 
evolve to improve its services and to protect itself in order to continue to guarantee its safety. 
As part of the X2Rail-1 project, Cyber Security is being considered through the design of an Open Pluggable 
Framework (OPF), which is responsible for managing surveillance data, decision-making functions and 
activation of adapted countermeasures. 
Work in progress is based on accurate analyses of the impacts of attacks on different communication standards. 
This work aims at identifying the most relevant parameters to be monitored for detecting and classifying the 
attacks. Different jamming attacks, with different waveforms, have to be processed in order to be able to detect 
the greatest number and to differentiate their respective impacts. 
Our approach is presented in more details in the following. We started our analysis with jammers bought on the 
Internet. These jammers constitute a true threat since they are cheap and very easily accessible to the general 
public. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Characterization of the signals produced by jammers accessible to general public 
The first step of our analysis was the characterization of the jamming signals. This has been carried out by 
recording a sequence of the signal with an oscilloscope (see Fig. 1). Then, a time-frequency transform tool has 
been applied (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Time-frequency representation of a jamming signal 
f1
f2
Sweep Period = SP
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It can be observed that the signal is as frequency sweeping signal, with a period (denoted in the following by the 
acronym SP for sweep period) of 5.5 us. 
Several jammers accessible to general public have been analysed and it turned out that it was always the same 
kind of signal. Furthermore, this result is confirmed by the outcomes of the FP7 SECRET project, where several 
jammers were characterized. The only difference between the jamming signals was the value of the SP, which 
varies from 5.5 us to 8 us behind the jammers that we tested. 
Then, the impact of the jamming attack on the performance of a Wi-Fi transmission 0 is investigated through 
measurements carried out in an anechoic chamber 0. 
As mentioned earlier, the nature of the jamming signal keeps the same, but the value of the SP can vary. We 
have then generated jamming signal in making varying their sweep period in order to investigate in detail the 
role of this SP parameter. 
 
 
2.1. EM attack on a WIFI communication applying a frequency sweeping interference signal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Experimentation with a 802.11n communication in presence of jamming signal 
In order to study the jamming signal impact on the IEEE 802.11n communication network performance, we 
selected an interference signal with a defined SP and we varied the Interference/Signal Ratio (ISR) by 
progressively increasing the interference signal power. 
 
ISR = PI/PS 
 
where PI is the interference jamming signal power and PS is the Wi-Fi signal power. PI and PS are obtained from 
oscilloscope measurements. 
We present, in Fig. 4, the minimum level of ISR required to loose the communication, as a function of the SP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 Required value of the ISR to interrupt the communication, as a function of the SP 
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We noticed three different behaviours in Fig. 4, represented by the Area A, B and C in the figure. The 
modulation of the Wi-Fi, the OFDM modulation (orthogonal frequency division multiplexing), plays a crucial 
role for the interpretation of these results, as is presented below. 
A: For a low SP, the FFT of the OFDM receiving stage modifies the distribution of the interference signal in the 
frequency domain. At the OFDM receiver stage, the interference signal appears as a series of frequency 
harmonics spaced by 1/SP. So, only some subcarriers are affected, then inducing isolated errors. 
B: Since the SP is higher, the interference only covers part of the 20 MHz channel over the duration of an 
OFDM symbol. 
C: All subcarriers are affected and interference covers the entire band of the channel. It corresponds to the worst 
case. 
Finally, we noticed that according to the sweep time, the interference signal power requires to corrupt the 
communication can vary of 30 dB. 
The analysis of commercial jamming was the first step. However, other threats come from the proliferation of 
EM signal generation equipment such as Software Defined Radio, communication shields and modules and 
antennas for instance. Now any jamming signal can be created with few efforts, and future standards will have to 
face this new threat.  
2.2. Detection of attacks 
To countermeasure a cyber-attack situation, the first step is to be able to detect such attack. Different detection 
solutions based on the monitoring of the physical link were studied in the project SECRET 0. In this TRA 
communication, we illustrate the monitoring approaches which can be developed on the data link layer. 
The monitoring approach is based on the use of the Wireshark Software. Wireshark is a network protocol 
analyser. It allows us to record all the traffic exchanged by the different computers using the wireless link. We 
obtain the frames from the Data Link layer (OSI layer 2) up to the Application layer (OSI layer 7). Currently, we 
are monitoring signalling frames from the IEEE 802.11n protocol and also segments from the TCP layer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Illustration of Wireshark 
By defining specific filters, we extract some information from Wireshark and we convert this information in 
numerical attack indicators. To illustrate the approach, the Fig. 6 represents the cumulative curve of the 
retransmitted frames in case of presence of jamming signal and without jamming signal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Cumulative curve of retransmitted frames 
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We obtained a separation of the space which can permit to envisage classification works based on these 
retransmitted frames indicator. Other indicators are currently under study. We are notably studying an indicator 
based on the Frame Check Sequence (FCS) which permits to indicate if the received frame is corrupted. 
3. Attack classification 
From the data that have been acquired previously, some “simple” features have been extracted to check whether 
it is possible to find some reproducible threshold separating the space between the case of a jamming and of a 
normal use. It is the case of a first analysis on the number of retransmitted data as presented in the Fig. 7. 
However, our next goal is to find more generic models that could be able to differentiate two classes, an attack 
(whatever the attack) and a normal use of the network. For that, we will consider the same data as previously 
presented but we will extract more features from them. The general architecture of the proposed system is 
presented on Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7 Proposed architecture for attack identification from different signals and data. 
This architecture contains two main parts. A first part considers the data using a time window approach and will 
compute some very simple features that can easily detect some specific misuse. One of these feature is the 
previously presented one that will detect jamming. This case is not the worth but for some of the attacks, a real 
danger could appear. For these, we have to react as soon and as easily as possible (by for instance closing a 
connection or turning off a controller). For them we need to compute some very simple features and that do not 
need a large delay in the data to be evaluated correctly. 
The second kind of danger that will be handled are less vital attacks that could occur. For them, we propose to 
compute some features on the data and, using an adaptive classification method, to detect normal and attack 
modes in the signal. For the features that will be extracted, we propose to evaluate the capabilities of the 
following ones: 
- Statistics on the data given by Wireshark: 
o Number of packets that are emitted from one source to another in a given time and their length; 
o FCS status of each transmissions; 
o Extraction from the flags; 
o Variability of the SNR on a duration. 
- Time-Frequency analysis on the raw signals: some of our past and present works focused on analysing 
time-frequency content of signals including the detection of the number of modes that they contain and 
their location in frequency, transitory effects, stationarity, regularity of predictability. This has been 
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done using time-frequency representation based on wavelets or on Fourier transforms, and using 
indexes such as information entropy and their adaptation to non-stationary signals. Such indexes can 
easily be adapted to the signals that we acquired to detect short or long-term changes in their behaviour.  
From these features, we then plan to apply machine learning techniques and specifically adaptive classification 
algorithms. We worked on algorithms that are able to detect some changes in the data and create new classes on-
the-fly if necessary. For the beginning of the process, we will identify some attacks that we were able to 
reproduce in experimental conditions such as what have been described before. Then, the algorithm will analyse 
the data as they arrive and try to classify it as one of the classes that exist: normal or one of the known attack. If 
none of them is consistent with the current data, a new class will be created that will be considered by defaults as 
attack and will need an intervention to check. 
From the data acquired, experimental results are being already processed. More data will be needed especially on 
the “normal behaviour” class, to perfect it and have some more interesting results.  
 
4. Human approach for Risk Analysis and Threat mitigation 
This third part aims at answering the question: what happens when the automatic countermeasures fail?  
4.1. Principles 
Our track of answer uses risk management methods dealing with prevention, decision-making, action taking, 
crisis management and recovery, taking into account consequences of unexpected events, whether the origin be a 
technical failure, an unwilling human error or a deliberated attack [5].  
The approach globally developed in our project consists in three complementary steps: prevention, where any 
unexpected event could be blocked or managed before its propagation; recovery, when the event is close to result 
in an accident, making protective measures mandatory to avoid the occurrence of the accident; and possibly after 
the accident occurs, management of consequences is required to minimize damages, at least the most severe 
ones. The two first parts of this paper deal with automatic approaches for prevention and recovery. If these 
automatic means fail, the humans involved in the control and/or in the supervision of the transport system remain 
the last “barrier” to mitigate the threat. The question is then: will they be able to do that, and which assistance 
tools could help them to succeed in these tasks? 
Our approach is focusing on “human(s) in the loop” systems and simulations, taking advantage of human 
ability to cope with unexpected dangerous events on one hand, and attempting to recover from human errors and 
system failures on the other hand. Our competences are developed both in Human-Computer Interaction and 
Human-Machine System. Interactivity and human-centered automation are our main focuses, [6]. 
The principle consists in 1) placing the professional human drivers and PCC supervisors in a realistic simulator, 
face with scenarios which would result of the consequences of a simulated cyber-attack and 2) to observe them 
in order to assess their abilities to react. 
4.2. Simulator PSCHITT-Rail 
The Simulator PSCHITT-Rail is developed at LAMIH, lab of the University of Valenciennes. It allows 4 
functionalities: 
- an editor of infrastructures: railways for tram and train, with their environment (traffic, passengers on the 
platform, technical equipment); 45 km of railways are stored in the data base and original tracks can be 
developed by the software designer, 
- an editor of scenarios allowing to create time tables, itinerary management and events. Several scenarios 
corresponding to unexpected events can be stored in the data bases and played several times to several human 
drivers or supervisors. For instance, events occurring on the trains could result on braking defaults, wrong on-
board signals… On the railway, error on rail switching control device, disturbance on the way signals, 
disturbances on rail-road crossing barriers can be simulated. Specific events can also be programmed by the 
software designer. For obvious reasons of confidentiality, we do not go further in describing the simulated 
attacks. 
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- a driving position with one driver equipped with the same devices as in a real train or tram (see Fig 8). In front 
of the cabin, several screens display the dynamic scenes the simulated tram is inserted in. 
- a supervision work place (Central Traffic Control Position) with a human supervisor face to the same devices 
as in a real system: network synopsis, trains signals, rail switching …  
The simulator is mobile and its movements are programmed to give the cabin some realistic dynamics regarding 
the simulated scenario (see Fig 9).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8 Simulator PSCHITT-Rail Driver position 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9 Simulator PSCHITT-Rail cabin 
 
4.3. Methodology  
 
The study consists of different steps: 
It starts to elaborate a list of threats and building related scenarios (ie. an external entity takes the control of the 
train, or of certain devices or the control of signals). The choice of the threats is done through an analysis of the 
vulnerability to cyber-attacks especially of connected and wireless devices. The consequent behaviour of the 
related devices is then used as a scenario to be simulated. Devices robust to cyber-attacks for instance because of 
their old technology are ruled out of the list. 
- Then it makes simulations of scenarios involving real humans (usually professional drivers of a tram 
company) and analysing the human behaviours through dedicated sensors like camera, eye movements, 
completed with dedicated indicators such as workload, Situation Awareness, [6] and questionnaires, in order to 
evaluate their abilities to detect the threats, and to give relevant answers. The scenario can be replayed of line in 
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front of the tested human operator in order to allow the analyst asking relevant questions for further explanations 
on the operator behaviour (called auto-confrontation). At least 10 real human operators must participate to the 
experiments, in order to allow the analysts comparing the different answers and detecting convergences as well 
as divergences in their behaviour.   
- The third step consists in analysing these answers, the most relevant ones could be derived to establish 
new strategies, new procedures and/or new devices useful for human countermeasures.  
- Finally, in an ideal project, these procedures and/or devices should be integrated to the simulator for 
evaluating their utility with new scenarios. 
 
4.4 Case studies and first results 
 
Following the methodology edicted above, the first choice was to identify a set of vulnerable devices the unusual 
behaviours of which could result of a cyber-attack, ie : 1) loss of the speed display (or display of a wrong speed 
value) in the cabin, 2) loss of braking, 3) jamming or disappearance of the camera rear view ) in order to study 
the driver answers.  The list of threats to be reproduced in the simulator is established according to 4 criteria : the 
technical plausibility of the threat (is it technically possible?) ; the dangerousness of the threat and because we 
are in an exploratory study, the technical possibility to simulate the attack with our simulator. In a more 
systematic approach, this last criterion can be waived in enhancing the simulator. A fourth criterion is the 
possibility to transpose the attack to another kind of rail system, for instance from tramway to metro or to train. 
 
As an example we describe here the result of the loss of control of the rear vision which usually allows the driver 
to monitor through cameras the behaviour of the passengers on the platform, especially when the tramway 
arrives in a station. At this moment he/she selects the side corresponding to the platform for opening the doors. 
That allows displaying on the screens the content of what take the front and rear cameras. Then the driver can 
monitor the passengers entering and going out the tram. 
The scenario starts with a normal driving during 30 minutes in a realistic and moderately loaded environment 
(down town, station with several pedestrians, rail-road crossing). Then the attack appears and results in the loss 
of rear vision when the tram arrives at an overcrowded station with the platform on the right side of the way.  
The driver must then select the right side doors to be open, but due to the attack, the rear view shows an empty 
platform, despite a lot of passengers were visible outside on the platform and even on the pedestrian sidewalk 
(through the simulator screen, see fig. 10). The usual procedure to follow by the driver in that case, is first to 
make the situation safe and then to call the Central Traffic Control operator for asking what to do (generally 
disembarking all passengers of the tram and returning to the garage for maintenance). 
Then we would have logically expected that the different tested drivers apply this procedure, thinking to a 
breakdown.  But none of the 6 drivers detected the display discordance (no extension of the stop time in the 
station, no particular comment, to him/herself or to the CTC operator, no special surprise). During the debriefing 
after the experiment all drivers say they did not detect an abnormal display of the rear views. They were all 
focused on the driving post showing the doors, they wait they close and then restarted the tram to quit the station.  
    
This preliminary result is very instructive and surprising:  
- many drivers are not trained for detecting such abnormal situations, they seem to favor the direct vision instead 
of the devices, even these ones increase the safety; 
- no training sessions are proposed to the drivers to detect as well as to manage such situations, and moreover no 
dedicated procedures do exist.  
- therefore, even the automatic countermeasures fail to prevent or to block the attacks, at least they could provide 
a signal in order to alert the human drivers or supervisor of the occurrence of the attack and place them in an 
increasing vigilance state for allowing them to react.  
Of course these preliminary results must be confirmed by the other cases as evoked above, but they are 
encouraging for developing a relevant methodology to reinforce the driver ability to detect and treat the 
cyberattacks, especially to define and implement relevant devices for that, that could be seen as “manual 
countermeasures”. Moreover this methodology could be extended to several other situations for reinforcing 
trouble shooting procedures for the rail driving and management. 
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Fig. 10: Example of rear view display (right part) incoherent with the real direct outside view (left part)  
5. Conclusion 
The first part of the paper presented our approach to investigate the impact of commercial jammers on a Wi-Fi 
transmission.  
First, the nature of the jamming signal has been identified through measurements and time-frequency analysis. 
The jamming signal has been modelled as a sweeping-frequency signal.  
Second, the jamming signal has been generated with an arbitrary signal generator, and measurements have been 
performed in an anechoic chamber to assess the impact of such signal on the quality of the Wi-Fi transmission. 
The goal of this study was to identify the most harmful interference factors on the Wi-Fi communication, with 
then the goal of paving the way for the design of a receiver able to adapt itself to become resilient to this kind of 
interference. 
It turned out that the relationship between the sweep period and the time-window duration of receiver signal 
process played a crucial role. An interesting perspective of this study would be to investigate other factors from 
higher network layers. 
 
When an attack is detected it is important to deploy countermeasures as early as possible. To accelerate the 
deployment speed of countermeasures, the work in progress is aimed at deploying its automatically towards 
jamming attack. We plan to deploy an adaptive classification algorithm based on machine learning techniques to 
give automatic preventive countermeasures to normal or one of the known attacks and create an alert class which 
require an audit in case of changes in the data.  
 
The human approach is developed to give a final answer to consequences of cyber-attacks especially if the 
preventive and recovery automatic countermeasures fail. In these cases, the human driver or supervisor is alone 
to face with the attack and we want to study experimentally the strategies he/she develops to answer to the 
attack. A methodology has been described involving the way to choose the more realistic attacks, to simulate 
their consequences in dedicated scenarios played on a realistic dynamic simulator and the data to be recorded 
during the experiments and the expected results. An example shows the experimental results of the loss of the 
rear view when the tram arrives at a station and when the passengers enter and go out the train. The behaviour of 
6 drivers were analysed and showed they did not detect the malfunction. We briefly discussed these first results 
and propose to extend the methodology to more general trouble shouting situations in order to define new 
operation procedures, especially in the cases they do not exist at present. 
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